Bidding one's value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey, 1961) , but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy-despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders-but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.
Introduction
In a sealed-bid second-price auction (SPA) with private valuations, where the highest bidder wins and pays the second highest bid, bidding one's value is a weakly dominant strategy (WDS, Vickrey 1961 ). This strategy requires only that each bidder behave rationally and it is unaffected by the number of rivals or their valuations, a bidder's risk preferences, or beliefs regarding rationality of rivals. Repeated experimental studies have found that subjects deviate from the WDS by overbidding much more than underbidding, resulting in overbidding on average (e.g., Kagel 1 While overbidding relative to the risk-neutral, Nash equilibrium (RNNE) has also been frequently found in first-price auctions (FPA, e.g., Kagel 1995 and Kagel and Levin 1993) , the "usual suspects," -risk aversion, beliefs about others' play, biases in perceptions of probabilities -that may explain overbidding in FPAs are of no avail in SPAs.
The contrast between SPAs and English auctions suggests that subjects discover the WDS in the English auction but not in the SPA; why is this the case? The cognitive process that leads to the discovery of the WDS in an SPA is far from trivial and an experimental subject may be unable to recognize it without experience 1 Given the differences in the strategy spaces, it is not strictly accurate to say that the two auction formats have the same dominant strategy because bidders in an SPA are choosing a bid, where in an English auction they are deciding whether to continue or not at the current price. In the former, the dominant strategy is to bid one's value, while in the later the dominant strategy is to remain in the auction until the price surpasses one's value.
or training. In an English auction, on the other hand, a subject needs to answer a simple question for herself: "Am I 'in' or 'out' ?" Answering this question leads a bidder to drop out at his value.
Subjects who do not bid their value in SPAs are nevertheless still motivated by common sense economic incentives, such as expected payoffs, though imperfectly.
Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) conjectured that subjects are aware that higher bidding increases the probability of winning the auctions but underestimate the additional cost associated with it. Instead of looking for dominant strategies, we suggest that optimistically irrational bidders are guided by a desire to maximize their profits combined with an inability to fully grasp the intricacies of the auction environment that allows them to view the consequences of their actions more favorably. We do this by modeling reasonable bidders who recognize (i) a higher bid increases the probability of winning, and (ii) the bidder may understate negative payoffs to higher bids.
These behaviorally plausible assumptions about bidders are the building blocks of our simple model of how out-of-equilibrium incentives might affect behavior in SPAs.
We test our model in SPAs in which we introduce a parameter that changes the expected payoff as a function of one's bid but does not affect the WDS. The parameter multiplies realized losses by some amount β, where β = 1 is the standard case. Consistent with previous results we find that when 0 < β ≤ 1, overbidding is pervasive. In contrast, when we change β to 20, overbidding is significantly reduced and underbidding is more prevalent. Overbidding when 0 < β ≤ 1 results in very few and fairly small losses (5.8% of auctions; median loss of $0.10). This is a product of our design: the domain of bidders' private values is quite large relative to the number of bidders, so the second highest bid is almost always below the highest value, even with overbidding. This allows us to rule out a "hot stove" type of learning whereby losses reduce overbidding in subsequent auctions. 2 Instead, it appears that the dramatic reduction in overbidding occurs when β is exogenously and publicly increased and can be attributed to changes in expected out-of-equilibrium payoffs.
While explanations for overbidding in various auction formats abound, and we compare the fit of our model to several of them in Section 5, the contribution of our model lies in its focus on the dominant strategy, adding to the recent theoretical interest in how dominant strategies influence decision calculus in games (e.g., obvious strategy-proofness, Li 2016). Our strong findings suggest that incentives outside equilibrium affect behavior in predictable ways in the laboratory, and probably in the field as well, even when equilibrium analysis predicts otherwise. Goeree et al.
(2002) show a similar result in a FPAs, but in FPAs, as in many other games where Nash equilibrium is the solution concept, best responding requires "cardinal" computations. Since such computations often involve a high degree of complexity and a heavy mental cost, we do not expect that the outcome in FPAs will exactly reflect 2 The change in behavior we observe is immediate, once the β parameter changes, and more extreme than could be plausibly predicted by learning models, as they would usually be applied (note that little is known about learning transfer between different but very similar games, such as the ones that result from the manipulation of β). In particular, reinforcement learning (Erev and Roth 1998) would predict no change in behavior before subjects have a chance to experience the new payoffs, unlike what we observe in the data. Fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine 1998 ) is also unlikely to fit the data, since the overbidding we observe can not be justified by any beliefs. Other models, such as learning direction theory (Selten and Stoecker 1986) and EWA (Camerer and Ho 1999), consider foregone payoffs. These might predict a faster response in auctions than other models, but its still hard to conceive how they could predict such an immediate change in bidding, when β changes, after the subjects have already been learning for 20 or 40 periods. Steady state concepts such as QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) are better suited to the task, e.g. predicting the immediate tendency towards value bidding when β rises without a need for subjects to actually experience losses. We calculate and fit such models in Section 5.
the point prediction of Nash equilibrium. It is much less surprising to find that the subjects' calculations, possibly involving heuristics, approximations and simplification rules, will be affected by a change in the incentives, even if these ought to have no effect on Nash equilibrium. This complexity motivates many models that predict overbidding by allowing bidders to make, and learn from, mistakes (e.g., QRE). In an SPA with private values, however, the dominant strategy can be reached with just "ordinal logic" of dominance, without even a need for common knowledge of rationality.
3 Thus, one would expect the solution norm-bid your value -to have its best chance for success in this environment. Our study shows that behavior is still guided by some degree of conscious profit maximization, but subjects' decision processes fail to recognize a characteristic that is very seldom present outside the lab: the dominant strategy. Errors in recognizing a dominant strategy require a new perspective on the cognitive processes underlying bidding behavior of the sort provided by optimistic irrationality to try to explain "errors" made by bidders that are as much a function of the simplicity of a dominant strategy as the complexity of the environment.
Optimistically Irrational Bidders
The overlooked availability of a WDS must be the starting point of any explanation to overbidding in SPA. We formalize the intuition behind the conjecture laid out in Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) by modeling an "optimistically irrational " bidder who understands that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overstate the additional probability of winning due to higher bidding and/or understate the losses associated with it.
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Let there be n risk-neutral bidders, each of whom privately observes her value x i , i = 1, ..., n. It is common knowledge that the x i 's are i.i.d draws from a distribution with a cumulative density function F (t), where believes that the expected payment is γ(x) b+x 2 , with 0 < γ(x) ≤ 1, i.e., expected losses
The first two assumptions simply mean that each bidder believes that all other bidders use the same, strictly monotonic bidding function, and that they receive their 4 The conjecture is as follows, "Bidding in excess of x in the second-price auctions would have to be labeled as a clear mistake, since bidding x is a dominant strategy irrespective of risk attitudes. Bidding in excess of x is likely based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with no real cost to the bidder as the second-high-bid price is paid."(Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, p. 1299, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] full value if they win the auction. Assumption 3 implies that a bidder potentially overstates the impact of bidding past his value because he believes values are closer together than they actually are. That is, he believes the increase in the probability of winning corresponding to an increase in his bid is greater than it actually is. This assumption finds support in other studies of auctions. For example, Cooper and Fang (2008) found that subjects who perceive their rivals to have values similar to their own are more likely to overbid in experimental SPAs, while Breitmoser (2015) uses "projection," the tendency to believe that rivals have value or beliefs similar to one's own, to explain the winner's curse. Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 means that an optimistically irrational bidder may still bid his value when α = α and γ(x) = 1. This does not require that the bidder recognizes the availability of the WDS. In fact, sincere bidding only requires γ(x) = 1 but allows α > α. 6 When b(x) > x, the value of α will, however, affect the extent one bids above his value.
Remark. There is a linear solution to the maximization problem with b(x; α, γ, n) = δ(α, γ, n)x.
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Put more simply, the bid will be a multiple of the value. The exact multiple will be a function of the number of competitors, how "close" a bidder believes those competitors' values are to his value, and the extent to which he understates the losses from overbidding. In the next section we make use of the fact that there is a linear solution to the maximization problem to inform our experimental design.
Experimental Test of the Model
Optimistically irrational bidders need not recognize the WDS but can be influenced
by "out-of-equilibrium" payoffs. is also more costly in the SPA than in the BDM with three or more bidders. Taken together, these observations about the shape of the expected payoff function seem to reflect the assumptions we make in our model. As a simple test of optimistically irrational bidders, we implement standard second-price, sealed-bid auctions for one unit of an indivisible good in the laboratory. The WDS predicts that players bid their values in equilibrium. We introduce a factor β by which we multiply eventual negative profits of the bidders. β does not affect the equilibrium if bidders are bidding sincerely because no bidder earns negative profits in equilibrium. However, the bidders' expected payoff functions do change, given that their opponents follow the equilibrium strategies; in Figure 1 we plot, for different values of β, the expected payoff function for a bidder whose rivals bid their values.
Given the remark in the previous section, we can determine how our experimental ]. This allows us to define γ β as a function of γ in a standard auction, i.e., γ 1 , which we do by setting
], and solving for γ β . Doing this, we get
We can substitute b(x) = δx into equation (1) to obtain
Plugging equation (2) into the linear solution, we solve the problem numerically.
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The results can be found in Table 1 . Assuming α = 1.1 and γ 1 = 0.95, i.e., a bidder slightly overstates the increase in his probability of winning associated with a higher bid and slightly understates his expected loss, the model predicts that δ * increases monotonically in β and bidding above value that ranges from 9.7% above value for a β = 0.1 to 0.5% above value for a β = 20. These numerical estimates yield three testable hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Subjects will overbid on average Hypothesis 2. Subjects will overbid by more on average when β < 1 than when
Hypothesis 3. Subjects will overbid by less on average when β > 1 than when β = 1
Experimental Details
The data come from nine experimental sessions conducted at Ohio State University. Students were recruited via e-mail and sessions took place in the Experimental Economics Lab. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In every session, subjects participated in 62 secondprice, sealed-bid auctions-2 trial auctions followed by 60 paying auctions-with 9 The linear solution can be found in the appendix.
either three or six bidders per auction. Subjects were randomly and anonymously re-matched between auction periods. In sessions with three bidder auctions, the exchange rate was $1=20 ECU, while the exchange rate in sessions with six bidder auctions was $1=14 ECU. The exchange rates were different in order to equalize the expected payoff between sessions with different group sizes. In the event that a player went bankrupt, they were no longer permitted to bid and were paid a participation fee of $8. Due to the uneven numbers after a bankruptcy, at the beginning of every period after a bankruptcy two subjects were randomly assigned to sit out that period in 3 bidder auctions, while five subjects were chosen to sit out in 6 bidder auctions. In the six sessions that started with β = 1, there were two bankruptcies; in the three sessions that started with β = 20 there were 10 bankruptcies, with all but one occurring in the first 10 periods. Complete session details can be found in Table 2 .
Results
Average differences between values and bids can be found in Table 3 , and Figures 2-6 compare subjects' bids and their values. Consistent previous research, we see overbidding on average in every treatment for every value of β. To test whether or not this overbidding is significantly different from 0, we calculated the mean difference between bid and private value for each session within a β regime, i.e., the block of periods during which β remained the same. Using these means as our measure of overbidding, average overbidding is significantly greater than 0 at the 5% level in every case except for β = 20 for β , and we do not observe learning in the direction of value bidding in these periods. 13 Nonetheless, there is a drastic reduction of 11 To compare overbidding, we conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests on the session means we calculated for the various β regimes. In pairwise tests of each value of β for all treatments, all differences were significant at the 5% level or better except for β = 1 versus β = 0.1 for β 3 1/20/0.1 (p = 0.454). 12 Merlob, Plott, and Zhang (2012) compare auction designs used for Medicare and Medicaid procurement auctions. In auction designs that allow for costless reneging, which is similar to bidding in an auction with β < 1, they also find overbidding. 13 We divide those periods for which β = 0.1 in these treatments, i.e., periods 20-39, into 4 blocks of 5 periods each. We then calculated session specific mean overbidding for each block. The means of these means for the blocks are 2.18, 2.40, 2.83, and 4.60, respectively. Although the means are increasing, pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank tests of these means reveal no significant differences between any of the first three blocks, while the last block is significantly different from all the others but further from the WDS.
overbidding in period 40. One possible explanation for the decline in overbidding in period 40 is that subjects who have overbid in earlier periods are chastened by losing money, a sort of "hot stove" learning. The evidence in Table 4 In order to move beyond unconditional means and investigate the effects of β while allowing for individual heterogeneity, we estimate a random effects Tobit model, regressing the difference between subject i's bid and his value in auction j on dummies for each β regime.
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The results in columns 1-4 of Table 5 are similar to the means in Table 3 . In every treatment bids are significantly higher when β = 0.1 than when β = 1; similarly, bidding is significantly lower in every treatment when β = 20 than when β = 1. We do, however, see some differences across treatments, and we reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects of D β=0.1 and D β=20 are jointly equal across all treatments (Wald test, p = 0.000 for both).
Although learning due to negative reinforcement is unlikely in β and p = 0.318, respectively); we find no significant differences at conventional levels across treatments in pair-wise comparisons of D β=0.1 and D β=20 .
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Observation 4. The effects of changes in β are robust to controls for individual differences and learning over time. 15 The only pairwise comparisons with p-values less than 0.2 are comparisons of D β=20 in β 3 1/20/0.1 with all other treatments. 16 One possible motivation for overbidding not found in Table 4 is spite. Cooper and Fang (2008) find that overbidding can be attributed to both a heightened sense of competition for those with high values, and spiteful behavior by those with low values. We see little evidence of spite. In results available from the authors, we ran the same models as in columns 5-8 but restricted observations to only those with values in the top 75% or the bottom 25% of the support of values. The results for either sample are similar to those in table 5. Moreover, among bids between 95 and 100, only 12 of 867 bids come from bidders with values in the bottom quarter of the support.
The linear trend presupposes that the effect of all periods is the same within a β regime, however Figure 2 suggests that the first few periods in a session might be slightly different. 17 In columns 9-12 we estimate the same model as in columns 5-8 but exclude the first 3 periods in each session. After excluding the first three periods, there is no significant learning over time for any value of β in any treatment.
Observation 5. Bidding behavior evolves substantially in the first few periods of a session, but little thereafter.
Alternative models
One important test of our model of optimistically irrational bidders is how well it fits the data relative to existing models. Among our candidate models, we begin by considering a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) with normally distributed errors,
given that without errors the SNE fails completely to predict the change in bidding when we shift β. Models that take all payoffs into account, even if they are not on the equilibrium path, are good candidates to explain our results. Perhaps the simplest way to consider all payoffs is to use the Nash model but assume that subjects' errors depend on the expected utility of each action in a systematic way. We do this by considering an SNE with a logistic error structure, as in Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
Finally, we consider is quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which also makes explicit use of the payoff function shapes, by positing that players choose an action with a 17 All sessions began with either β = 1 or β = 20, so the relevant data are the first few data points in the first and third panels of Figure 2 . Similar to Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004), we observe bidding below the WDS at first before bids rapidly increase. probability proportional to its expected payoff. 18 In preliminary comparisons, we find that the SNE+normal model outperforms the other two models in all but one β-number of bidder combinations. 19 The reason is that, under a logit error structure, a high frequency of underbidding is predicted for intermediate private values, since the expected payoffs are quite flat to the left of the maximum (as seen in Figure 1 );
yet we see far more overbidding than underbidding in all cases. 20 QRE improves on the Nash model with logistic errors, but still performs worse than the Nash model with normal errors.
One way to account for the fact that we observe much more overbidding than underbidding is to allow bidders to experience joy-of-winning (JOW). JOW can be incorporated by adding an extra fixed utility, U i , to the payoff of subject i, conditional on winning the auction. 21 It is easy to show that with such modification a 18 Another possible model that we do not consider is a level-k model of the sort used to explain auction results in Crawford and Iriberri (2007) . This model predicts neither overbidding nor reaction to different values of β, even allowing symmetric errors. In such a model, players of level one or higher are characterized by different beliefs, but they all best respond to these beliefs. Since bidding one's value is a weakly dominant strategy in a SPA and does not depend on a player's beliefs (or risk attitudes), players of all levels are predicted to bid their values, as in any Nash equilibrium.
19 Table A1 in the appendix provides the details of the comparison of fits among all alternative models we consider. 20 For example, for a value of 50 and β = 0.1 we should see approximately the same amount of underbidding as overbidding, which is clearly not the case. 21 Note that JOW looks superficially similar to spiteful behavior (e.g., Andreoni et al. 2007, Cooper and Fang 2008) . The difference is that a subject experiences JOW only in the case where she wins, while a subject exhibits spite even if she does not win but in cases where she raises the price for other bidders. In Cooper and Fang's experiment, for example, subjects can sometimes acquire information about their rival's value. They find that, when subjects know that their value is close to their rival's, overbidding is more likely to result in a costly loss and subjects overbid by less. Conversely, when subjects know that their value is well below their rival's, hence overbidding is unlikely to result in winning the auction but can raise the price for their rival, overbids are larger. This is not dissimilar to our manipulation of β, and Cooper and Fang suggest that this behavior is consistent with a modified JOW/spite model. Even the modified model cannot help explain the difference between SPAs and English auctions, and Figures 3, 4 , and 5 reveal that the constant overbidding predicted by JOW is more plausible than spite in our data, so we consider only JOW.
new dominant solution emerges, with b i (x i ) =
22 This implication helps as it predicts that players who enjoy winning will overbid with respect to the Nash equilibrium and the amount of overbidding will depend inversely on β. The JOW parameter j is found to be positive and yields a significantly higher likelihood in every case. Nonetheless, SNE with normal errors still provides the best fit among JOW models.
To evaluate its broad applicability, in Table 6 we examine how well the SNE models with normal errors, both with and without JOW, fare against our model of optimistically irrational (MI) bidders in SPAs, English auctions, and FPAs, by comparing estimated log-likelihoods. 23, 24 We find that our model fares better than the SNE with just normal errors (but no JOW) in all auctions. On the other hand, the SNE with normal errors and JOW outperforms our model in every auction. The SNE with normal errors and JOW may have slight advantages by the measure of Table 6 , but these advantages do not reveal the full story. In Table 7 we break out the fit by the number of bidders and values of β. In this case, the SNE fares better than MI in six of the nine β-number of bidder combinations. In Table 8 , we compare the the predicted mean overbidding by optimistically irrational bidders and the SNE with JOW to the observed mean overbidding. In 4 out of the 7 cases, the magnitude of overbids by MI 22 Details are provided in the appendix. 23 The English auction data come from Georganas (2011), and the FPA data come from Dyer et al. (1989) . 24 The derivation of optimistic irrationality for FPAs can be found in the appendix. The implications of optimistic irrationality for bidding in English auctions are much more straightforward. Assumption 4 of the model lays out the bidder's beliefs about expected payments and losses if he wins at a price greater than his value, but there is no uncertainty over payments or losses in the English auction, so beliefs should be perfectly accurate, leading even an optimistically irrational bidder to bid his value.
bidders is closer to the predicted overbidding than SNE bidders who experience JOW.
While on a strictly econometric basis, SNE+JOW seems to be performing slightly better than MI, MI outperforms SNE+JOW in several instances. 25 Moreover, there are good qualitative reasons not to be satisfied with JOW, chief among them its failure to explain why JOW occurs in SPAs but not in the strategically analogous English auction. Ultimately, further work and additional data will be needed to completely analyze the relative strengths of the two models.
Conclusions
Experiments consistently find that in second-price, sealed-bid auctions with private values-a mechanism with incomplete information where bidding one's value is a WDS -subjects deviate significantly from the WDS. The availability of a "dominant" action that is best irrespective of the other features of the decision is rare in games with incomplete information and in strategic situations outside the lab. The behavior of a bidder in a second-price auction who fails to recognize or discover such an available strategy is still likely to be guided by rules that are useful in a wide range of situations, such as cost-benefit analysis. Subjects in our SPAs provide support for this characterization of bidders: their bidding is reasonable if not optimal. Subjects overbid on average but their overbidding is influenced by manipulations which affect expected payoffs out of equilibrium but not the dominant strategy. In accordance with lessons learned in more familiar settings, as we vary the magnitude of the penalty for losses, a natural reaction is to hedge and bid lower when the penalty is relatively larger and to be more aggressive when the penalty is relatively lower.
The behavioral changes may not be optimal in a second-price auction, yet they are sensible when viewed through the lens of their applicability in richer environments.
We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who fail to recognize the availability of a dominant strategy. Bidders in this model understand that raising their bid increases the probability of winning but may either overstate the increase in the likelihood of winning and/or fail to appreciate the costs associated with increasing their bids. We fit several existing models designed to explain overbidding using our data, but we find that most of these models perform poorly even when they consider out-of-equilibrium payoffs that would be affected by our experimental manipulation, and none of the models outperform ours consistently.
Our results build on the cautiously optimistic findings in Cooper and Fang (2008) .
They find that bounded rationality-more than non-standard preferences like spite and JOW-contributes to overbidding in SPAs. Subjects in their experiment could purchase costly and noisy information about rivals' values, information which does not affect the WDS. Subjects who purchase the information were significantly more likely to overbid, but the behavior of those subjects who did not purchase information was consistent with theoretical predictions. They conclude by noting that this heterogeneity may be of less significance outside the lab where selection might weed out the irrational bidders, leaving only rational bidders. Our finding of large and theoretically unpredicted responses to our treatments can inform mechanism designers, theorists and practitioners who are concerned that such selection may be insuffi-cient or too slow: even in cases with a dominant strategy, the nature of incentives outside equilibrium can influence behavior. In instances where the common sense implications of manipulating out-of-equilibrium incentives can steer behavior toward the desired norm, such as in SPAs, designers may be able to use these incentives to design more stable and efficient mechanisms. 
(8) , and simplifying, we can rewrite (A.1) as
Assume that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], γ(x) = γ < 1 and b(x) = δx, with δ ≥ 1. Equation (A.2) can be written as: 
A.4 Examining the consistency of joy of winning
The fit of the SNE and the behavioral models is improved when we allow for joy of winning. But is joy of winning a consistent explanation across all different values of β that we have used in the experiments? As we have seen, joy of winning gives a clear prediction for every β. A person who understands the dominant strategy but has joy of winning j, will overbid by exactly j when β = 1 but will overbid by 10j when β = 0.1. On the other hand she has to overbid by only j/20 when β = 20. In following Figure 6 we examine if individual players' behavior is consistent with this model. 
